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Abstract 
This paper addresses the question of how the brain of an animal achieves 
cognitive integration, that is to say how it manages to bring its fullest 
resources to bear on an ongoing situation. To fully exploit its cognitive 
resources, whether inherited or acquired through experience, it must be 
possible for unanticipated coalitions of brain processes to form. This 
facilitates the novel recombination of the elements of an existing 
behavioural repertoire, and thereby enables innovation. But in a system 
comprising massively many anatomically distributed assemblies of neurons, 
it is far from clear how such open-ended coalition formation is possible. The 
present paper draws on contemporary findings in brain connectivity and 
neurodynamics, as well as the literature of artificial intelligence, to outline a 
possible answer in terms of the brain’s most richly connected and 
topologically central structures, its so-called connective core. 
1. Introduction 
The brain of an animal is a massively parallel, distributed control system that attempts 
to maintain certain metabolic variables within acceptable bounds while fulfilling a 
procreative mission. Evolution has solved a very difficult control problem, namely 
how to effectively exploit all those parallel, distributed resources when responding to 
a large variety of unpredictable circumstances. Moreover, since the brain of a bee 
contains fewer than one million neurons while that of a human contains around 100 
billion, evolution has found a solution (or solutions) to this problem on a wide range 
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of scales (Chittka & Niven, 2009). What are the underlying principles of the solution 
or solutions that evolution has found? 
 The same question can be recast in more cognitive terms. Let us say that perfect 
cognitive integration is achieved when the animal brings the totality of what it knows 
to bear on the ongoing situation — its grasp of the sensorimotor contingencies of 
multiple domains and its understanding of the associated affordances, plus the full 
contents of both its long-term (episodic-like) memory and its short-term (working) 
memory. Humans excel at cognitive integration. Yet failures of cognitive integration 
are commonplace even in humans, such as when I remove the U-bend of my sink then 
pour its dirty contents back into the plug-hole, causing an unwelcome deluge. On the 
other hand, apparent triumphs of cognitive integration have been demonstrated in 
non-human animals, such as innovative tool manufacture (Weir, et al., 2002; Bird & 
Emery, 2009) 1 and sequential tool use (Bird & Emery, 2009; Wimpenny, et al., 2009; 
Taylor, et al., 2010). 2 How is cognitive integration achieved in the biological brain? 
 Drawing on the literature of computer science and artificial intelligence as well 
as that of neuroscience, this paper surveys a range of mechanisms that might underlie 
some of the most impressive feats of cognitive integration performed by non-human 
animals. The focus is on achievements, such as those just cited, that appear to require 
combinatorial search of a space of possible sequences of action, or (to put it another 
way) that show signs of “insight” in the sense of Epstein (1985, p.627), who defines 
insightful behaviour as “The spontaneous interconnection of two repertoires of 
behavior which [have] been established separately”. (For a contemporary discussion 
of the concept see Shettleworth (2010).) The paper advocates a mix of serial and 
parallel processing to explain these accomplishments. However, in the context of a 
massively parallel neural substrate, the serial processing in question bears little 
resemblance to that of a conventional computer. Rather, each serial step results from 
the competitive formation of a (possibly novel) coalition of brain processes drawn 
from a large repertoire of potential combinations. To facilitate this blend of serial and 
parallel, it is hypothesised that a certain pattern of connectivity is required, wherein 
                                                
1 Four-year old children consistently fail at the wire-bending task while eight-year old 
children typically succeed (Beck, et al., 2011), a result which lends credibility to this 
paradigm as a benchmark for a distinctive capacity for innovation. 
2 These experiments are used here as motivating examples. The aim is not to explain their 
results per se. Attempting to do this without further development of the theory would most 
likely result in just-so stories. The paper uses examples from avian cognition. For a wider 
overview of animal tool use, see Seed & Byrne (2011). 
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information and influence funnels in to and fans out from a connective core of 
cognitively important brain regions, resulting in an integrated response to the animal’s 
ongoing situation. 
2. Explaining Cognitive Prowess in Terms of Computation 
We will begin with explanations that inherit their terms from classical artificial 
intelligence and cognitive science, then move to explanations in the language of 
neurodynamics. The cognitive feats of interest all feature an element of planning, that 
is to say, the discovery of a novel sequence of actions to achieve a goal. 3 In the 
sequential tool use paradigm of Bird & Emery (2009), a stone has to be dropped into a 
narrow tube to release a trap-door. But no suitably-sized stone is available. Instead, 
the bird has to first drop a large stone into a wide tube to release a small stone, which 
can then be used in the narrow tube. Similarly, in the wire-bending paradigm of Weir, 
et al. (2002), the bird has to retrieve a bucket from a tube. But the bucket is out of 
reach, and a tool is required to retrieve it. Moreover, no suitable ready-made tool is 
available, and success at the task requires a straight piece of wire first to be bent into a 
hook. 
 Success in such tasks only counts as planning if it is achieved on first trial, 
when the subject is unfamiliar with the problem. As soon as the subject has performed 
the task successfully once, planning is no longer strictly necessary. Moreover, even if 
the task is performed successfully on first trial, this cannot be counted as planning if it 
is the result of extensive trial-and-error and / or luck. These explanations for success 
have to be ruled out. Of course, an innate behaviour involving sequences of actions, 
such as nest-building (Hansell, 2007), doesn’t necessarily require planning either, 
however complex it might be. The hallmark of a genuine planning task is the need to 
search a tree of alternative sequences of actions. 
 The topic of planning has received extensive treatment in the field of artificial 
intelligence (AI) (Russell & Norvig, 2010, Ch. 10), so it is instructive to consider the 
range of methods that can be deployed for solving planning problems on a computer 
while asking whether the brains of clever animals might operate in a similar way. 
Planning algorithms that are predominantly serial rather than parallel can be classified 
                                                
3 The term “planning” is sometimes used in the animal cognition literature to mean planning 
for the future needs (Raby, et al., 2007). Here we are using the term in the sense prevalent in 
artificial intelligence and robotics. 
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according to the order in which they explore a state space. A backward chaining 
technique is one that works backwards from a desired goal state, via an action that 
would achieve that goal state, to a subsidiary goal state. This process is then repeated 
until a state is reached that matches the current state of the world. The sequence of 
actions that is built up along the way is a plan. Conversely, a forward chaining 
technique begins with the current state of the world and works forwards, via an action 
that can be executed right away, to a successor state. This process is then repeated 
until a state is reached in which the desired goal is attained. 
 Could it be the case that non-human animals who solve planning problems do so 
in a way that resembles an AI planner using either backward chaining or forward 
chaining? If they do, then it is possible in principle to discriminate experimentally 
between the backward-chaining hypothesis and the forward-chaining hypothesis, 
using an extension of the experimental setup described by Bird & Emery (2009). 
Instead of stones and wide and narrow tubes, the extended apparatus uses multiple 
tubes, each with a cap with a uniquely shaped hole cut in it (Fig. S1). Only an object 
that matches the hole can be used in that particular tube. Using this apparatus, it’s 
possible to set up a variety of planning problems, and, by varying the combinations of 
caps and objects, to make every new trial effectively a first trial. In particular, it is 
possible to devise a pair of planning problems that differ in difficulty for a forward 
chaining method but not for backward chaining, as well as a complementary pair of 
planning problem that differ in difficulty for a backward chaining method but not for 
a forward chaining method (Fig. S2). 
 The range of options explored in AI is not exhausted by the forward chaining / 
backward chaining opposition, however. Planning techniques have also been devised 
that combine forward and backward chaining. For example, the GraphPlan algorithm 
interleaves a forward-chaining graph construction phase with a backward-chaining 
graph search phase (Blum & Furst, 1997). Perhaps, when animals plan, their brains 
use a hybrid method of this sort. Indeed, if circumstances resembling the setup just 
described arise in the wild, in which the animal is cued with both an initial state (the 
sight of the tools) and a goal state (the sight of the food) before it acts, it seems 
unlikely that either a blind forward search (disregarding the goal state) or a blind 
backward search (disregarding the initial state) would be favoured by evolution. If an 
animal’s brain uses a hybrid forward and backward method, we would not expect to 
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find a marked difference in performance between the two paired conditions using the 
apparatus just described. 
 All of the AI methods cited so far work at the level of so-called “primitive” 
actions, that is to say, actions that are immediately executable (under the right 
conditions), such as picking up a twig or approaching a stone. In hierarchical 
planning (or hierarchical task network planning), by contrast, a suitable sequence of 
actions is found by refining a high-level action (such as “get food”) into a sequence of 
lower-level sub-actions (such as “get a tool then retrieve the bucket”), then repeating 
this process until a plan comprising just primitive actions is reached (such as “get the 
wire, bend the wire, insert the wire into the tube, …”). Hierarchical organisation of 
behaviour is also implicit in many AI systems, such as those based on the cognitive 
architectures SOAR or ACT-R (Langley, et al., 2009). Could there, perhaps, be an 
element of hierarchical decomposition in the way the brain of an animal arrives at a 
novel sequence of actions to attain a goal? If this were true, we would again expect no 
performance differential between the two paired conditions in the proposed sequential 
tool-use experiment. 
3. Explaining Cognitive Prowess in Terms of Neurodynamics 
The guiding metaphor in the kind of explanation envisaged above is that of classical, 
serial computation in the von Neumann style. To properly fill out such explanations, 
an account of how the proposed computational mechanisms are realised in the brain 
must be supplied. A variety of contemporary proposals seek to provide such an 
account (Duncan, 2010; Zylberberg, et al., 2011). However, a feature common to all 
general-purpose planning methods is the need to carry out combinatorial search, and 
this is where their computational burden chiefly lies. The usual way to carry out 
combinatorial search on a conventional computer is with the aid of a dynamic data 
structure such as a stack. A stack is a structure that grows and shrinks over time in so-
called “last-in-first-out” order, like a pile of plates only the top of which is accessible. 
In a search application, the stack is used to record branches of the tree of possibilities 
that remain to be explored. Although a plausible account can be constructed of how 
the brain might realise a form of serial processing resembling that of a conventional 
computer, it is less than obvious how such an account could convincingly be extended 
to describe the neural analogue of a stack. 
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 Moreover, to implement a search algorithm on a serial virtual machine realised 
in a neural substrate would be to squander the brain’s enormous potential for 
parallelism. Undoubtedly there are cognitive processes that are best carried out in a 
strictly serial order so that the effects of one operation are available for the next, such 
as mental arithmetic (Sackur & Dehaene, 2009) or the inner rehearsal of a sequence of 
actions (Shanahan, 2006). Indeed, for planning problems with minimal search 
requirements, a few serial steps of inner rehearsal to anticipate the outcome of a two- 
or three-action plan might be adequate. Perhaps the sequential tool use paradigms of 
Bird & Emery (2009) and Wimpenny, et al. (2009) fall into this category, because the 
challenges they involve can be met without departing from a narrow set of 
possibilities for action that are given by the learned affordances of the apparatus. In 
computer science terms, the branching factor of the tree of (obvious) possibilities is 
small, whether it is searched by backward chaining or forward chaining, and the 
reward can be obtained without moving beyond the obvious. 
 By contrast, what is impressive about Betty’s performance in the wire-bending 
experiment of Weir, et al. (2002) is that it apparently combines experience from two 
micro-domains of expertise that were not previously associated, namely the domain of 
bending pliable materials and the domain of using tools to retrieve food. 4 That her 
brain was able to blend the relevant brain processes together is impressive enough. 
But even more striking is that her brain assembled the necessary raw ingredients for 
the blend in the first place, given no indication of their mutual relevance to the 
problem at hand (or at beak, rather). The branching factor of the tree of non-obvious 
possibilities for action is huge, which puts us firmly back in combinatorial territory. 
Surely this tree of possibilites is not searched by a slow, serial virtual machine 
realised on a massively parallel substrate. Could it be instead that the underlying 
massively parallel system can effect the search without sifting through an infeasibly 
large number of combinatorial possibilities one at a time? Perhaps, out of the 
maelstrom of competitive and co-operative local interactions between populations of 
neurons, a global network state corresponding to a suitable plan can emerge, 
                                                
4 Accomplishments of this sort evoke the frame problem, in the philosophers’ sense of that 
term (Fodor, 1983; Dennett, 1984; Shanahan, 2009). This is the challenge of explaining how 
all of an agent’s beliefs that are relevant to a problem or situation can be brought to bear 
without incurring an impractical cost to explicitly discriminate relevant from non-relevant 
beliefs. This is obviously closely related to the issue of cognitive integration. As a solution to 
the frame problem, the present paper builds on the proposal of (Shanahan & Baars, 2005). 
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“coalescing” out of the available dynamical elements rather than being the result of a 
sequence of discrete computational steps. 
 This is a somewhat fanciful sounding description, but it is reminiscent of a wide 
class of computations that can be characterised in terms of local interactions among 
parallel elements that collectively converge to a minimal state (an attractor). One of 
the best known examples is the Hopfield net. A Hopfield net is a network of artificial 
neurons with recurrent (feedback) connections which confer attractor dynamics on it 
(Hopfield, 1982; Amit, 1989). The network is trained to “remember” a number of 
patterns (its attractors). Given an input pattern, the trained network converges to a 
state corresponding to the nearest attractor, that is to say, to the remembered pattern 
that most closely resembles the input. It can function, therefore, as a form of 
associative memory. A Hopfield net, like any neural network, is inherently parallel, 
and each successive state is the product of strictly local computation. In other words, 
when a neuron is updated, its new state is a function only of the state of its 
neighbours, the neurons it is directly connected to. 
 Attractor networks have many practical applications (Smith, 1999), and have 
been proposed as fundamental building blocks of the brain (Amit, 1989; Freeman, 
1999, Ch. 4; Rolls, 2009; Lansner, 2009). However, our interest here is not in building 
blocks, not in mere components of the brain. Rather, we are interested in how the 
brain’s global dynamics can settle on a pattern of activity that results in effective 
motor output given a novel challenge. To see how a global solution can arise from 
local processing with brain-scale parallelism, we need to look at networks with more 
complex topologies than a conventional attractor network. Moreover, the brain 
exhibits much richer dynamics than a conventional attractor network, including 
complex temporal patterns of spiking, metastability, rhythmic activity, and 
synchronisation phenomena. In the following sections, the challenge of achieving 
cognitive integration, as exemplified by Betty’s wire-bending, is recast as a problem 
of “coalition formation” in a dynamical system of this sort. 
4. The Coalition Formation Problem 
In computer science, we know how to exploit parallelism in various narrow domains. 
For example, the simulation of physical phenomena such as the diffusion of smoke in 
a burning building or the flow of air over a wing is most efficiently carried out using 
para
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detection or optical flow are straightforwardly expressed in terms of parallel 
algorithms. In these cases, the breakdown of the overall problem into numerous sub-
problems that can be carried out independently falls right out of the spatial structure 
of the problem domain. These so-called embarrassingly parallel problems are solved 
in the brain too. The visual cortex, for example, exploits neural parallelism in order to 
detect edges and motion rapidly. But this sort of parallelism is not much use for 
achieving cognitive integration. When an animal confronts a novel situation, the 
problem of drawing on the totality of its past experience to come up with a sequence 
of motor outputs that is effective despite never having been tried before is not one that 
can be straightfowardly broken down into trivial sub-problems. 
 To see the difficulty in its proper context, we need to think of the brain not so 
much as a set of parallel, distributed computational processes that take input, produce 
output, and transmit data to each other, but rather as a collection of parallel, 
distributed dynamical processes that unfold in continuous (rather than discrete) time 
and exert continuous influence on each other (Fig. 1). This is the character of the 
wetware that is biology’s provision to cognition. Within this wetware substrate, the 
past experience of an animal is rendered into a set of brain processes that, both 
individually and in combination, are specialised for particular situations. The ongoing 
construction, maintenance and expansion of this set of specialists, and the increase in 
specialist expertise that results, is the responsibility of learning in the classical sense 
(Sutton & Barto, 1998; Shettleworth, 2010, Ch. 4). But specialist expertise is limited. 
A hallmark of cognitive sophistication is the capability to move beyond the tried-and-
tested, to transcend domain-specific expertise, and thereby to tap the full 
combinatorial potential of an established sensorimotor repertoire. 5 The basic question 
of cognitive integration, then, is how the elements of an ever-changing, ever-
expanding repertoire of specialist brain processes can be combined in previously 
untried coalitions. 
 The question, in other words, is how open-ended coalition formation is possible 
in a dynamical system like the brain. Implicit in the idea of coalition formation here is 
the idea of a winning coalition. One coalition has to arise that dominates the dynamics 
of the brain, shuts out all rivals, and dictates the animal’s behaviour. A winning 
coalition will be in the ascendant only briefly. When events move on it will be 
                                                
5 We are again reminded of the frame problem here, as well as Mithen’s (1996) notion of 
cognitive fluidity. 
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supplanted by a successor. But its victory, albeit temporary, must be complete. An 
animal whose brain allowed incompatible possibilities for action equal influence on 
its final motor output would not exhibit coherent behaviour. An animal cannot 
simultaneously move to the left and to the right, for example. It has just one body and 
this body is spatially confined and subject to various kinematic constraints. So the 
question of how open-ended coalition formation is possible is really the question of 
how competitive open-ended coalition formation is possible. 
 The basic question of open-ended coalition formation naturally leads to a 
number of subsidiary questions. In particular, how is it possible for a new coalition of 
sensory, motor, and memory processes to form that is effective, that results in 
behaviour that is more beneficial to the animal than if it had stuck to tried-and-tested 
combinations? There is no point in entertaining possibilities that are plain daft, for 
example. It does no good to an animal confronted with a food item that is just out of 
reach to initiate a courtship dance. But manipulating materials that resemble tools is 
promising. In short, candidate members of a successful coalition must be relevant to 
the situation at hand (or at beak). However, not every combination of relevant 
processes is effective. In variations of the trap-tube test (Seed, et al., 2006), pulling 
the plunger one way is prima facie as relevant as pulling it the other way. But one 
way results in the loss of the food reward, while the other way results in its 
attainment. The ideal system will freely explore novel coalitions of relevant 
processes, but will bias the competition between them according to their expected 
outcomes. 
 So the mechanism of coalition formation is not going to entertain every 
coalition with equal probability. The probability distribution in question will be 
shaped by experience. But our present interest is the connectivity and neurodynamics 
that makes open-ended coalition formation possible in the first place. How is it that a 
coalition of anatomically distributed brain processes can form whose constitution is 
not hardwired in advance? Cognitive integration is achieved when the animal is able 
to draw upon the full battery of its neuronal resources, mixing and matching them as 
required, to find an effective, and sometimes innovative, response to unfamiliar 
situations. A winning coalition, a coalition of brain processes that issues in overt 
behaviour, will comprise just a small subset of those resources. But to the extent that 
cognitive integration is achieved, the whole brain will have participated in an open 
competition to find that subset. 
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5. Brain Connectivity 
When one computer exchanges information with another through the Internet, the 
information in question is chopped up into packets, and each packet is sent separately 
to its destination. Packets can arrive in a different order from that in which they were 
sent (to be re-assembled in the correct order on arrival), and different packets can go 
via different routes. So the physical connections that underlie this process give away 
very little about the flow of information in the network they support. But the brain of 
an animal works very differently. If one brain region is to exercise a direct influence 
on another, it must be directly connected to that region. So the pattern of physical 
connections between brain regions is good evidence of how information and influence 
flow around the brain. It makes sense, therefore, to study brain connectivity with a 
view to understanding how arbitrarily constituted coalitions of anatomically 
distributed brain processes form. 
 The large-scale network organisation of an animal’s brain is revealed in several 
steps (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Sporns, 2010). First, anatomical investigations yield 
data about the existence of pathways between brain regions, either using traditional 
tracing methods or using diffusion-based imaging in vivo. This data is then compiled 
into a connectivity matrix covering a major sub-division of the animal’s forebrain — 
the cerebral cortex, say, or perhaps the entire telencephalon. This is the animal’s 
(structural) connectome. The resulting connectivity matrix is is then subjected to 
analysis using the mathematical theory of complex networks (or “graphs”), which 
reveals its large-scale organisation. The animal that has been most thoroughly 
investigated in this way is the human (Hagmann, et al., 2008; Iturria-Medina, et al., 
2008; Gong, et al., 2009, van den Heuvel & Sporns, 2011). But connectivity matrices 
and network analyses have been carried out for a number of other species, including 
the fruit-fly (Chiang, et al., 2011), the cat (Scannell, et al., 1999; Sporns, et al., 2007; 
Zamora-López, et al., 2010),  the macaque (Sporns, et al., 2007; Modha & Singh, 
2010), and the pigeon (Shanahan, et al., 2012). 
 A number of topological features consistently arise in these studies. These 
include small-world organisation and modularity. A sparse network (all brain 
networks are sparse) is a small world if it has a mean path length comparable to, but a 
clustering coefficient higher than, an equivalent randomly wired network (Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998) (Fig. 2A). A network’s mean path length is the average length of the 
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shortest path between any two nodes, while its clustering coefficient is the proportion 
of a node’s neighbour’s that neighbour each other averaged over the whole network. 
A small world network retains a capacity for locally concentrated processing, but 
facilitates the rapid flow of information around the network as a whole. A network is 
modular if it can be partitioned into subsets of nodes (modules) that are densely 
connected internally but only sparsely connected to other subsets (Girvan & Newman, 
2002) (Figs. 2B). Modules are suggestive of functional specialisation. 
 Another consistent feature of brain networks is the presence of topologically 
significant hub nodes (Sporns, et al., 2007). Although different authors use slightly 
different criteria for designating a node as a hub, the key attribute in all cases is high 
connectivity. A hub node is one that has an unusually large number of connections, or 
one that lies on an unusually large number of short paths. Hub nodes can be further 
classified in the context of a network’s modularity. A connector hub is one that plays 
an important role in communication between modules (Fig. 2C), while a provincial 
hub is one that plays an important role in communication within a module. The 
human, macaque, cat, and pigeon connectomes have all been shown to possess a 
pronounced connective core of topologically central hub nodes (Hagmann, et al., 
2008; Zamora-López, et al., 2010; Modha & Singh 2010; van den Heuvel & Sporns, 
2011; Shanahan, et al. 2012). 
 The inclusion of the pigeon in this list is significant because it serves as a 
prototypical avian species, and it would be surprising indeed if the same network 
properties were not present in the (larger) forebrains of corvids. Moreover, the set of 
hub nodes that comprises the connective core in the pigeon is constituted by brain 
regions that are either homologous to, or functionally analogous to, connective core 
regions in humans and macaques (Shanahan, et al., 2012). These include a region of 
the hippocampal formation, which is implicated in long-term memory, and a 
prefrontal region (the nidopallium caudolaterale), which is implicated in goal-directed 
action and working memory. The presence in all these species of a connective core 
that includes a prefrontal functional analogue as well as homologous hippocampal 
structures supports the hypothesis of convergent evolution of intelligence in apes and 
birds (Emery & Clayton, 2005; Seed, et al., 2009), and is suggestive of a common 
neural substrate for cognition. 
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6. The Connective Core Hypothesis 
What are the specific cognitive implications of the fact that an animal’s forebrain has 
the network properties just listed? The contention of this paper is that a brain’s 
capacity for cognitive integration depends on the presence within the telencephalon of 
a pronounced connective core, that is to say a small set of hub nodes that are 
topologically central to the whole network and richly connected to each other 
(Shanahan, 2010a, Ch. 4). Its topologically central situation entails that information 
and influence can funnel in to and fan out from the connective core, which makes it 
ideally suited to fulfil three functional roles that together promote the availability of 
the brain’s full repertoire of process combinations. According to the hypothesis, the 
connective core is 
 1) a locus of broadcast, 
 2) a medium of coupling, and 
 3) an arena for competition. 
 The connective core is a potential locus of broadcast because the ongoing 
pattern of activity in the regions comprising it can exercise direct influence on a large 
number of other forebrain regions, and indirect influence on an even larger number 
via just a few hops in the network. Suppose an animal is presented with an unexpected 
object (such as a straight piece of wire in a tool manufacture paradigm). The resulting 
visual stimulus excites its visual areas, which in turn can influence activity in its 
connective core. Thanks to the core’s rich connections to other regions, this influence 
can then be disseminated throughout the forebrain, arousing the widespread activation 
of multiple neuronal groups (Baars, 1988; Dehaene, et al., 2006), including those 
associated with the visible affordances of the object (it can be pushed, picked up, 
pecked at, used as a prod, and so on). 
 To the extent that the connective core fulfils this broadcast role, it addresses one 
aspect of the coalition formation problem, namely how the set of brain processes 
relevant to the ongoing situation becomes active and is thereby given the opportunity 
to join a coalition that might eventually take over the animal’s motor apparatus, while 
those that are irrelevant are excluded (Shanahan & Baars, 2005). The relevance or 
otherwise of a process is not decided centrally, in any sense. Thanks to the connective 
core, this responsibility is delegated to the processes themselves, which carry it out 
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individually and in parallel. But cutting down the set of active processes to only those 
that are relevant is only half the problem. Even the pool of relevant brain processes 
may be large, and the set of possible coalitions constituted by members of that pool is 
combintaorially larger. 
 One consequence of the combinatorics is the prohibitive quantity of wiring that 
would be needed if each group of neurons was directly connected to every other group 
of neurons with which it might enter into a coalition. This is where the second 
purported role of the connective core comes into play. In much the same way that 
activity within the connective core can influence any part of the forebrain, so any part 
of the forebrain can influence the connective core and, via the connective core, any 
other part of the forebrain. So the connective core has the potential to act as a 
communications infrastructure capable of routing information and influence between 
any two brain processes, allowing them to become coupled (Shanahan, 2010a, Ch. 4 
& 5; Zylberberg, et al., 2010). Thanks to its covergent-divergent wiring pattern, the 
connective core allows arbitrary combinations of processes to become coupled 
without recourse to combinatorial wiring. This addresses the most prominent aspect of 
the coalition formation problem from the standpoint of cognitive integration, as it 
allows novel coalitions to arise. 
 However, like any channel of communication, the connective core has only 
limited bandwidth. Rival coalitions must compete for this bandwidth. In a telephone 
network, contention for limited bandwidth is resolved equitably. In the early days of 
telephony, customers on a busy trunk line had to wait until a channel became 
available, while nowadays they might have to tolerate a reduction in their quality of 
service. Either way, everyone gets a fair share of the bandwidth. By contrast, 
contention for access to the connective core is not resolved equitably, according to the 
present hypothesis. Rather, it is resolved through winner-takes-all competition. The 
coalition that ends up driving activity in the connective core will shut out its 
competitors by preventing their constituent processes from exchanging influence and 
information through it. In this sense, the competition plays out in the connective core 
itself. It thereby addresses a further aspect of the coalition formation problem, namely 
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the need for a single coalition at a time to dominate the dynamics of the brain and 
dictate the animal’s behaviour. 6 
 So far we have been imagining a single transition in the state of the brain. We 
have exmanined the putative role played by the connective core in producing the 
globally integrated brain state that determines an animal’s response to its current 
situation. So the emphasis up to now has been on parallel processing. But the 
distinctive blend of serial and parallel processing supported by the connective core 
involves many such transitions. Insofar as the connective core has only a limited 
capacity, it constitutes a central bottleneck in the brain (Pashler, 1984; Marois & 
Ivanoff, 2005). Apart from helping to enforce the sort of winner-takes-all competition 
that is necessary for an animal to commit to a coherent course of action, this central 
bottleneck facilitates serial processing, which is necessary for the chaining of mental 
operations (Sackur & Dehaene, 2009). Thanks to its limited capacity, a serial 
procession of states emerges via the connective core. Yet each state-to-state transition 
in this series is the product of competition and co-operation among massively 
numerous parallel processes (Fig. 3). 
 This unconventional model of computation can be characterised in dynamical 
systems terms. The brain settles into global, attractor-like states, mediated by the 
connective core. But these states, though attractor-like, are only temporary. That is to 
say, they are not stable but metastable (Kelso, 1995; Bressler & Kelso, 2001; Werner, 
2007; Deco, et al., 2011). A coalition is held together by its own complex dynamics, 
which will eventually precipitate its break-up. (A likely feature of this complex 
dynamics is synchronous oscillation (Fries, 2009; Shanahan, 2010b; Shanahan & 
Wildie, 2012).) Moreover, in a behaving animal, the brain is subject to external 
perturbation due to incoming sensory stimulation, which can similarly upset the 
stability of a coalition. So the overall brain-wide pattern of activity is one of coalition 
formation, followed by break-up, followed by the formation of a new coalition, and so 
on, yielding a serial procession of global metastable states punctuated by transients. 
                                                
6 Competitive mechanisms have long been thought to play an important part in brain 
dynamics (Desimone & Duncan, 1985). The need for the brain to settle into an integrated 
global state that determines a coherent behavioural outcome when faced with competing 
opportunities or threats has been dubbed the action selection problem (Prescott, 2007). 
Various structures, notably the basal ganglia, have been hypothesised to address the action 
selection problem (Redgrave, et al., 1999). The same competitive mechanisms are presumed 
to be implicated in the competition for the connective core. 
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 One way to think of the blend of sequential and parallel processing envisioned 
here is in terms of a serial virtual machine realised on a massively parallel neural 
substrate (Dennett, 1991, pp.209–226; Sloman & Chrisley, 2005). However, the 
processing carried out by this serial virtual machine is unlike that of a conventional 
von Neumann computer. In the present case as in a conventional computer we have 
states, but those states possess an ongoing internal dynamics that is absent in 
conventional computation. In the present case as in a conventional computer we have 
transitions from one state to another, but these transitions are here mediated by a rich 
temporal dynamics that is quite different from the discrete state-to-state transitions 
found in conventional computation. 
 Inherent in the way the present system operates is the possibility of dealing with 
a cognitive challenge either through a series of sequential internal steps, as in a 
conventional AI planning algorithm, or through a form of parallel search resembling 
the convergence of an attractor network, or indeed through some combination of both 
methods. However, continuing the comparison with a von Neumann architecture, we 
might ask what, in the envisaged serial virtual machine, is the analogue of memory in 
a conventional computer. For the serial machine to carry out anything resembling the 
sequential processing of an AI problem solving algorithm, it must be possible for 
certain aspects of the present state to endure and influence future states. This is 
accomplished in the framework of this paper in the following way. When the 
presently dominant coalition of processes breaks up and gives way to a successor, 
certain members of the outgoing coalition can remain active, retaining information, 
possibly to join a later dominant coalition. There is ample evidence — from lesion 
studies with delayed response tasks, for example — that mnemonic brain processes of 
this sort are supported by the prefrontal cortex in mammals, and by its analogue in 
birds (the nidopallium caudolaterale) (Fuster, 2008; Güntürkün, 2005). These 
structures are members of the connective core in both taxa. 
 To summarise, the presence of a small set of topologically central regions in the 
forebrains of mammals and birds has been established empirically. The potential 
implications of this finding for understanding animal cognition, and perhaps for 
understanding animal consciousness, are profound. They are encapsulated by the 
following slogan: unity from multiplicity, serial from parallel. Unity arises from 
multiplicity because the connective core ensures that a singular, coherent response to 
the ongoing situation is integrated from the brain’s full resources. Serial emerges from 
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parallel because brain-wide information and influence are channeled through the 
connective core, which acts as a limited bandwidth processing bottleneck, allowing 
mental operations to be chained together. 
7. Synthetic Methodology 
The connective core hypothesis purports to explain how the brain’s connectivity and 
dynamics enable certain kinds of sophisticated cogntion that have been demonstrated 
experimentally in non-human animals. How can we test this hypothesis and, insofar as 
it is true, build a profile of the serial and parallel activity involved in the successful 
performance of different tasks? The behavioural paradigm described earlier is one 
approach. But to really get at the underlying mechanisms, such behavioural methods 
need to be supplemented. Although neuroanatomy, imaging, and electrophysiological 
recording are vital sources of relevant data, the focus of this final section is a 
complementary but less well-established methodology, namely the construction of 
computer and robot models. 
 As Braitenberg (1984) noted, in his law of “uphill analysis and downhill 
invention”, it is often more difficult to infer principles of internal operation from 
experimental observation than it is to invent mechanisms that produce the same 
outward behaviour. Invention cannot be a substitute for observation, because more 
than one mechanism is typically capable of generating a given behaviour. What we 
seek are computer and robot models that not only generate the required behaviour, but 
are also consistent with the empirical findings of neuroscience. A computer program 
is not a scientific theory, of course, and nor is a working robot. But properly 
engineered computer programs and robots are built according to principles and 
specifications, and it is these principles and specifications, rather than any artefact 
conforming to them, that contribute to our scientific understanding. A computational 
model of a neuroscientific hypothesis is a demonstration that the hypothesis is 
sufficiently clear to be implementable. Moreover, the rigours of implementation often 
reveal unexpected nuances of a hypothesis, as well as extensions and alternatives that 
might otherwise have been missed. 
 This is the rationale behind the field of computational neuroscience. But here 
we are advocating the extension of this synthetic methodology to the embodied case, 
to the use of robots. This approach has been applied to various brain structures, 
including the hippocampus (Fleischer, et al., 2007), the basal ganglia (Prescott, et al. 
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2006), and the amygdala (Ziemke & Lowe, 2009), as well as to low-level behaviours 
such as phonotaxis in invertebrates (Webb, 2002). (For an overview of recent work, 
see Krichmar & Wagatsuma (2011).) In lieu of detailed experimental data, can the 
synthetic approach be used to bolster the connective core hypothesis, and the claim 
that it can explain aspects of animal cognition? 
 Some steps in this direction have already been taken. In Shanahan (2006), a 
cognitive architecture is presented whose key component is a network of artificial 
neurons (the global workspace (Baars, 1988)) that fulfils the same role as that 
imputed to the connective core. It is an arena for competition among rival groups of 
neurons, each of which attempts to make it settle into a particular pattern of 
reverberating activation. The winning pattern is broadcast back to the full cohert of 
competitors, giving rise to a cycle of competition followed by broadcast. Thus, a 
serial procession of states is produced, but each serial step is the outcome of parallel 
processing in tens of thousands of artificial neurons. This serial process is used to 
rehearse the consequences of actions before they are carried out. The resulting 
predictions modulate the salience of possible actions in the context of a winner-takes-
all action selection mechanism, which controls a simple simulated robot. The 
resulting model was used to emulate a classic experiment of Tolman and Gleitman 
(1949) that appeared to show a capacity for look-ahead in rats (Fig. S3). 
 The work just described showed that a global neuronal workspace — a structure 
analogous to a connective core — could form the basis of serial computation in a 
massively parallel setting, and demonstrated its deployment in a control architecture 
for a robot. However, the model used a form of artificial neuron that lacks biological 
fidelity. A more realistic computer model of competitive access to a global neuronal 
workspace was developed by Deheane and colleagues using spiking neurons 
(Dehaene, et al., 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2005). A complementary spiking 
model of global neuronal workspace broadcast was later reported in Shanahan (2008) 
(Fig. 4), and then elaborated by Connor and Shanahan (2010). A related model 
showcasing the possible role of the brain’s connective core in inter-process 
communication was described by Zylberberg, et al. (2010). 
 While these models contain many of the elements required to instantiate the 
connective core hypothesis, they are also lacking certain crucial features. In particular, 
they do not address the issue of coalition formation, which is central to the present 
paper. On the assumption that elevated levels of synchronous oscillation in spatially 
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separated brain regions are a sign that those regions are operating as a coalition, the 
model described Shanahan (2010b) is a step in the right direction. The model is based 
on oscillators, and is thus defined at a higher level than spiking neurons. Moreover, 
although its connectivity is modular and small-world, it lacks a connective core. 
Nevertheless, the model shows how metastable coalitions can form and break up in a 
modular, small-world network of dynamical elements. Cabral, et al. (2011) have 
shown that a similar setup can be used to model human resting state fMRI data, 
including the default mode network in which the regions of the human connective 
core are prominent. 
 A more complete implementation of the connective core hypothesis, one that 
could actually exhibit cognitive integration, would combine the important features of 
each of the models described. The first step would be to reverse engineer the basic 
blueprint of the vertebrate brain, something akin to what Striedter (2005) calls the 
“vertebrate brain archetype” (after the 19th Century biologist Richard Owen). This 
should describe the simplest viable brain that incorporates every structure common to 
all vertebrates (whether as homologues or functional analogues), and retain those 
connectivity properties that are similarly shared. The next step would be to construct a 
model brain according to this blueprint that conforms to the connective core 
hypothesis. 
 The key features of this model would be 1) biologically realistic network 
topology, specifically a hierarchically modular small-world network with a connective 
core of hub nodes, 2) functional differentiation to include at least sensory, motor, 
basal gangliar, amygdaloid, hippocampal, and prefrontal regions, and 3) embodiment 
in a behaving robot endowed with a basic motivational system and associative 
learning mechanisms. To be consistent with the framework of the present paper, the 
connective core would be expected to exhibit certain dynamical properties, namely 1) 
episodes of (metastable) broadcast punctuated by competition, and 2) the formation of 
coalitions of brain processes drawn from a large, open-ended repertoire. If the 
proposals of the present paper are correct then, by scaling up the model in different 
ways, it ought be possible to replicate the cognitive feats of a range of species, 
including those that seemingly demonstrate “insight”. 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
There is growing evidence that the brains of cognitively sophisticated animals are 
hierarchically modular small-world networks with connective cores comprising sets 
of connector hubs. According to the hypothesis of this paper, possession of a 
connective core is a prerequisite for sophisticated animal cognition. As well as 
unifying the distributed activity of the brain’s massively parallel resources, the 
connective core promotes cognitive integration by allowing the formation of novel 
coalitions of brain processes, and facilitates serial mental operations. However, 
possession of a connective core is no guarantee of cognitive sophistication. Indeed, 
the evolutionary pressures that led to this network organisation may at first have been 
less to do with cognitive prowess than to do with the space and energy costs of 
connecting large numbers of neurons to each other. 
 It is typically taken for granted that the most parsimonious explanation of an 
animal’s behaviour is to be preferred in the absence of evidence ruling it out. Yet it is 
not always obvious what constitutes pasimony (Heyes, 2012). A simple explanation 
of a simple behaviour may look like the right choice at the level of a single species. 
But from a wider scientific perspective, a unified theory that encompassed the full 
spectrum of animal behaviour would be preferable. The goal of supplying such a 
theory is likely to be furthered by a better understanding of the underlying neural 
mechanisms. It may be the case, for example, that behaviours that can be given an 
associative account and behaviours that seem to demand a cognitive account both 
emerge from the same underlying network organisation. Perhaps the neural 
underpinnings of “insight”, far from being mysterious, are prevalent in large 
centralised nervous systems, thanks to massive parallelism, rich dynamics, and a 
particular network organisation. 
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Figure 1: Competitive coalition formation. A coalition of coupled brain 
processes forms (shown as hatched circles) to the exclusion of rival 
coalitions, partly under the influence of internal dynamics (including the 
preceding coalition) and partly under the influence of external stimuli. 
Coalition membership is drawn from a large pool that includes sensory, 
motor, and memory processes. Brain processes are anatomically localised, 
functionally specialised populations of neurons, but a coalition of brain 
processes can be anatomically distributed and functionally diverse. The 
dominant coalition governs the behaviour of the animal until it breaks up 
and is succeded by a new coalition. 
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Figure 2: (A) A small-world network built using the Watts-Strogatz 
procedure (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). This network lacks modularity. (B) A 
modular small-world network that more closely resembles the large-scale 
structural connectivity of an animal’s brain (but lacks connector hubs). (C) 
A modular small-world network with connector hubs. A node is designated 
a connector hub if it plays a significant role in communication between 
modules. (D) The connector hubs, along with their dense interconnections, 
are designated the connective core of the network. 
A B 
C D 
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Figure 3: The connective core supports a distinctive blend of serial and 
parallel processing. The transition from one broadcast state to another 
results from competition (differently coloured circles) and co-operation 
(similarly coloured circles) among parallel brain processes (here organised 
into five modules). In this case, the broadcast influence of the green 
coalition gives rise to a competition among three potential successors 
(yellow, cyan, and magenta). The magenta coalition triumphs, giving rise 
to the next broadcast state. 




Figure 4: (A) The architecture of the spiking neuron model of a global 
neuronal workspace presented in Shanahan (2008). The workspace nodes 
and their interconnections are functional analogues of the connective core, 
according to the hypothesis of the present paper. (Compare Fig. 2C.) The 
blue portions were included in the computer simulation. (B) A raster plot of 
the output from the model, showing the sequential production of 
reverberating spatial patterns in the connective core (global workspace). 
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Figure S1: A modified version of the apparatus of Bird & Emery (2009). 
Only an object of the right shape can be inserted through the cap on the 
tube to release the reward. Combinations of such boxes with different caps 
can be used to present multiple new instances of a planning problem. Photo 




Figure S2: An experiment using multiple variants of the apparatus of Fig. S1 for 
discriminating between a forward chaining approach to planning and a backward 
chaining approach. If the subject uses backward chaining, then B (three initial 
possibilities) should be a greater challenge than A (two possibilities), with little 
difference between C and D (two possibilities each). Conversely, if the subject 
uses forward chaining then D (three possibilities) should be a greater challenge 








Figure S3: (A) The T-maze experiment of Tolman and Gleitman (1949). The rat 
explored the maze freely, and was rewarded in both arms (dark- and light-coloured). 
It was then removed from the maze, and subjected to a shock in a dark-coloured 
room. Subsequently it showed a preference for the right (light-coloured) arm of the 
maze, although neither arm was visible when it made its choice, suggesting a 
capacity to anticipate the effects of actions. (B) A robot analogue of Tolman & 
Gleitman’s experiment (Shanahan, 2006). The robot has an initial preference for 
turning right when facing green. But it is trained to associate turning right with red, 
for which it has an aversion. Thanks to an inner rehearsal mechanism, it can 
anticipate the effect of turning right, causing it to overcome its prior preference and 
turn left instead. 
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